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Abstract— In this paper, we propose an asynchronous dis-
tributed algorithm for the computation of generalized Nash
equilibria in noncooperative games, where the players interact
via an undirected communication graph. Specifically, we extend
the paper “Asynchronous distributed algorithm for seeking
generalized Nash equilibria” by Yi and Pavel: we redesign
the asynchronous update rule using auxiliary variables over
the nodes rather than over the edges. This key modification
renders the algorithm scalable for highly interconnected games.
The derived asynchronous algorithm is robust against delays
in the communication and it eliminates the idle times between
computations, hence modeling a more realistic interaction
between players with different update frequencies. We address
the problem from an operator-theoretic perspective and design
the algorithm via a preconditioned forward-backward splitting.
Finally, we numerically simulate the algorithm for the Cournot
competition in networked markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and literature overview
Noncooperative generalized games over networks is cur-
rently a very active research field, due to the spreading of
multi-agent network systems in modern society. Such type of
games emerge in several application domains, such as smart
grids [1], [2], social networks [3] and robotics [4]. In a game
setup the players, or agents, have a private and local objective
function that depends on the decisions of some other players,
which shall be minimized while satisfying both local and
global, coupling, constraints. Typically each agent defines
its decision, or strategy, based on some local information
exchanged with a subset of other agents, called neighbors.
One popular notion of solution for these games is a collective
equilibrium where no player benefits from changing its
strategy, e.g. a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). Various
authors proposed solutions to this problem [5], [3], [6].
These works propose only synchronous solutions for solving
noncooperative games. So, all the agents shall wait until the
slowest one in the network completes its update, before start-
ing a new operation. This can slow down the convergence
drammatically, especially in large scale and heterogeneous
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systems. On the other hand, adopting an asynchronous update
reduces the idle times, increasing efficiency. In addition, it
can also speed up the convergence, facilitate the insertion of
new agents in the network and even increse robusteness w.r.t.
communication faults [7]. The pioneering work of Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis [8] can be considered the starting point of the
literature on parallel asynchronous optimization. During the
past years, several asynchronous algorithms for distributed
convex optimization were proposed [9], [10], [11], [12],
converging under different assumptions. The novel work
in [13], provides a simple framework (ARock) to develop
a wide range of iterative fixed point algorithms based on
nonexpansive operators and it is already adopted in [14] to
seek variational GNE seeking under equality constraints and
using edge variables.
In this paper, we propose an extension of the work in [14].
Specifically, we consider inequality coupling constraints and
use a restricted set of auxiliary variables, namely, associated
with the nodes rather than with the edges. Especially this
latter upgrade is non-trivial and presents technical challenges
in the asynchronous implementation of the algorithm, which
we overcome by analyzing the influence of the delayed
information on the update of the auxiliary variables. The use
of node variables only, rather than edge variables, preserves
the scalability of the algorithm, with respect to the number
of nodes.
B. Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: Section III formalizes
the problem setup and introduces the concept of variational
v-GNE. In Section IV the iterative algorithm for v-GNE
seeking is derived for the synchronous case. The asyn-
chronous counterpart of the algorithm is presented in Sec-
tion V. Section VI is dedicated to the simulation results for
the problem of Cournot competition in networked markets.
Section VII ends the paper presenting the conclusions and
the outlooks of this work.
II. NOTATION
A. Basic notation
The set of real, positive, and non-negative numbers are
denoted by R, R>0, R≥0, respectively; R := R∪ {∞}. The
set of natural numbers is N. For a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n,
its transpose is A>, [A]i is the i-th row of the matrix and
[A]ij represents the elements in the row i and column j. A 
0 (A  0) stands for positive definite (semidefinite) matrix,
instead > (≥) describes element wise inequality. A⊗B is the
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Kronecker product of the matrices A and B. The identity ma-
trix is denoted by In ∈ Rn×n. 0 (1) is the vector/matrix with
only 0 (1) elements. For x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn, the collective
vector is denoted as x := col(x1, . . . , xN ) = [x>1 , . . . , x
>
N ]
>.
diag(A1, . . . , AN ) describes a block-diagonal matrix with
the matrices A1, . . . , AN on the main diagonal. The null
space of a matrix A is ker(A). The Cartesian product of
the sets Ωi, i = 1, . . . , N is
∏N
i=1 Ωi.
B. Operator-theoretic notation
The identity operator is by Id(·). The indicator function
ιC : Rn → [0,+∞] of C ⊆ Rn is defined as ιC(x) = 0
if x ∈ C; +∞ otherwise. The set valued mapping NC :
Rn ⇒ Rn denotes the normal cone to the set C ⊆ Rn, that
is NC(x) = {u ∈ Rn | sup〈C − x, u〉 ≤ 0} if x ∈ C and ∅
otherwise. The graph of a set valued mapping A : X ⇒ Y
is gra(A) := {(x, u) ∈ X × Y |u ∈ A(x)}. For a function
φ : Rn → R, define dom(φ) := {x ∈ Rn|f(x) < +∞}
and its subdifferential set-valued mapping, ∂φ : dom(φ) ⇒
Rn, ∂φ(x) := {u ∈ Rn| 〈y − x|u〉 + φ(x) ≤ φ(y) , ∀y ∈
dom(φ)}. The projection operator over a closed set S ⊆ Rn
is projS(x) : Rn → S and it is defined as projS(x) :=
argminy∈S‖y − x‖2. A set valued mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rn
is `-Lipschitz continuous with ` > 0, if ‖u− v‖ ≤ `‖x− y‖
for all (x, u) , (y, v) ∈ gra(F); F is (strictly) monotone if
∀(x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F) 〈u−v, x−y〉 ≥ (>)0 holds true, and
maximally monotone if it does not exist a monotone operator
with a graph that strictly contains gra(F). Moreover, it is α-
strongly monotone if ∀(x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F) it holds 〈x−
y, u−v〉 ≥ α‖x−y‖2. The operator F is η-averaged (η-AVG)
with η ∈ (0, 1) if ‖F(x)−F(y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2− 1−ηη ‖(Id−
F)(x)− (Id−F)(y)‖2 for all x, y ∈ Rn; F is β-cocoercive
if βF is 12 -averaged, i.e. firmly nonexpansive (FNE). The
resolvent of an operator A : Rn ⇒ Rn is JA := (Id +A)−1.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Mathematical formulation
We consider a set of N agents (players), involved in a
noncooperative game subject to coupling constraints. Each
player i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N} has a local decision vari-
able (strategy) xi that belongs to its private decision set
Ωi ⊆ Rni , the vector of all the strategies played is x :=
col(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ Rn where n =
∑
i∈N ni, and x−i =
col(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ) are the decision variables of
all the players other than i. The aim of each agent i is to
minimize its local cost function fi(xi,x−i) : Ωi×Ω−i → R,
where Ω =
∏
i∈N Ωi ⊆ Rn, that leads to a coupling between
players, due to the dependency on both xi and the strategy
of the other agents in the game. In this work we assume the
presence of affine constraints between the agent strategies.
These shape the collective feasible decision set
X := Ω ∩ {x ∈ Rn |Ax ≤ b} , (1)
where A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm. Then, the feasible set of
each agent i ∈ N reads as
Xi(x−i) :=
{
y ∈ Ωi |Aiy − bi ≤
∑
j∈N\{i}bj −Ajxj
}
,
where A = [A1, . . . , AN ], Ai ∈ Rm×ni and
∑N
j=1 bj = b.
We note that both the local decision set Ωi and how the
player i is involved in the coupling constraints, i.e. Ai and
bi, are private information, hence will not be accessible
to other agents. Assuming affine constraints is common in
the literature on noncooperative games [15], [5]. In the
following, we introduce some other common assumptions
over the aforementioned sets and cost function.
Standing Assumption 1 (Convex constraint sets): For
each player i ∈ N , the set Ωi is convex, nonempty and
compact. The feasible local set Xi(x−i) satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification.
Standing Assumption 2 (Convex and diff. cost functions):
For all i ∈ N , the cost function fi is continuous, β-Lipschitz
continuous, continuously differentiable and convex in its
first argument.
In compact form, the game between players reads as
xi ∈ argmin
y∈Rn
fi(y,x−i) s.t. y ∈ Xi(x−i) . (2)
In this paper, we are interested in the generalized Nash
equilibia (GNE) of the game in (2).
Definition 1 (Generalized Nash equilibrium): A
collective strategy x∗ is a GNE if, for each player i,
it holds
x∗i ∈ argmin
y∈Rn
fi(y,x
∗
−i) s.t. y ∈ Xi(x∗−i) . (3)
B. Variational GNE
Let us introduce an interesting subset of GNE, the set of so
called variational GNE (v-GNE), or normalized equilibrium
point, of the game in (2) referring to the fact that all players
share a common penalty in order to meet the constraints.
This is a refinement of the concept of GNE that has attracted
a growing interest in recent years - see [16] and references
therein. This set can be rephrased as solutions of a variational
inequality (VI), as in [6].
First, we define the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game
(2) as
F (x) = col ({∇xifi(xi,x−i)}i∈N ) , (4)
that gathers all the subdifferentials of the local cost functions
of the agents. The following are some standard technical
assumptions on F , see [17], [18].
Standing Assumption 3: The pseudo-gradient F in (4) is
`-Lipschitz continuous and α-strongly monotone, for some
`, α > 0.
Standing Assumption 2 implies that F is a single valued
mapping, hence one can define VI(F,X) as the problem:
find x∗ ∈X, s.t. 〈F (x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 , ∀x ∈X . (5)
Next, let us define the KKT conditions associated to the game
in (2). Due to the convexity assumption, if x∗ is a solution
of (2), then there exist N dual variables λ∗i ∈ Rm≥0, ∀i ∈ N ,
such that the following inclusion is satisfied:
0 ∈ ∇xifi(xi) +A>i λ∗i +NΩi(x∗i ) , ∀i ∈ N
0 ∈ b−Ax∗ +NRm≥0(λ∗i ) .
(6)
While in general the dual variables {λi}i∈N can be different,
here we focus on the subclass of equilibria sharing a common
dual variable, i.e., λ∗ = λ∗1 = · · · = λ∗N .
In this case, the KKT conditions for the VI(F,X) in (5)
(see [6], [19]) read as
0 ∈ ∇xifi(xi) +A>i λ∗ +NΩi(x∗i ) , ∀i ∈ N
0 ∈ b−Ax∗ +NRm≥0(λ∗) .
. (7)
By (6) and (7), we deduce that every solution x∗ of VI(F,X)
is also a GNE of the game in (2), [6, Th. 3.1(i)]. In addition,
if the pair (x∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (7), then
x∗ and the vectors λ∗1 = · · · = λ∗N = λ∗ satisfy the KKT
conditions for the GNE, i.e. (6) [6, Th. 3.1(ii)].
Note that under Standing Assumptions 1–3 the
set of v-GNE is guaranteed to be a singleton [19,
Cor. 2.2.5; Th. 2.3.3].
IV. SYNCHRONOUS DISTRIBUTED GNE SEEKING
In this section, we describe the Synchronous Distributed
GNE Seeking Algorithm with Node variables (SD-GENO).
First, we outline the communication graph supporting the
communication between agents, then we derive the algorithm
via an operator splitting methodology.
A. Communication network
The communication between agents is described by an
undirected and connected graph G = (N , E) where N is the
set of players and E ⊆ N ×N is the set of edges. We define
|E| = M , and |N | = N . If an agent i shares information
with j, then (i, j) ∈ E , then we say that j belongs to the
neighbours of i, i.e., j ∈ Ni where Ni is the neighbourhood
of i. Let us label the edges el, for l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. We
denote by E ∈ RM×N the incidence matrix, where [E]li
is equal to 1 (respectively −1) if el = (i, ·) (el = (·, i))
and 0 otherwise. By construction, E1N = 0N . Then, we
define Eouti (respectively E ini ) as the set of all the indexes
l of the edges el that start from (end in) node i, moreover
Ei = Eouti ∪ E ini . The node Laplacian L ∈ RN×N of an
undirected graph is a symmetric matrix and can be expressed
as L = E>E, [20, Lem. 8.3.2]. In the remainder of the
paper, we exploit the fact that the Laplacian matrix is such
that L1N = 0N and 1>NL = 0
>
N .
B. Algorithm design
Now, we present a distributed algorithm with convergence
guarantees to the unique v-GNE of the game in (2). The
KKT system in (6), can be cast in compact form as
0 ∈ F (x) + Λ>λ+NΩ(x)
0 ∈ b¯− Λx+NRmN≥0 (λ)
, (8)
where λ = col(λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ RmN , Λ =
diag(A1, . . . , AN ) ∈ RmN×n and b¯ = col(b1, . . . , bN ) ∈
RmN .
As highlighted before, for an agent i, a solution of its
local optimality conditions is given by the strategy xi and
the dual variable λi. To enforce consensus among the dual
variables, hence obtain a v-GNE, we introduce the auxiliary
variables σl, l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, one for every edge of the
graph. Defining σ = col(σ1, . . . , σM ) ∈ RmM and using
E = E ⊗ Im ∈ RmM×mN , we augment the inclusion in (8)
as
0 ∈ F (x) + Λ>λ+NΩ(x)
0 ∈ b¯− Λx+NRmN≥0 (λ) +E
>σ
0 ∈ −Eλ .
(9)
The variables {σl}l∈{1...M} are used to simplify the analysis,
but we will show how we decrease their number to one
for each node, increasing the scalability of the algorithm,
especially for dense networks.
From an operator theoretic perspective, a solution $∗ =
col(x∗,σ∗,λ∗) to (9) can be interpreted as a zero of the sum
of two operators, A and B, defined as
A : $ 7→
 0 0 Λ>0 0 −E
−Λ E> 0
+
 NΩ(x)0
NRmN≥0 (λ)

B : $ 7→
F (x)0
b¯
 .
(10)
In fact, $∗ ∈ zer(A+ B) if and only if $∗ satisfies (9).
Next, we show that the zeros of A + B are actually the
v-GNE of the initial game.
Proposition 1: Let A and B be as in (10). Then the
following hold:
(i) zer(A+ B) 6= ∅ ,
(ii) if col(x∗,σ∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A+B) then (x∗, λ∗) satisfies
the KKT conditions in (7), hence x∗ is the v-GNE for
the game in (2).
The proof exploits the property of the incidence matrix E
of having the same null space of L, i.e. ker(E) = ker(L),
and the assumption that the graph is connected. It can be
obtained via an argument analogue to the one used in [5,
Th. 4.5], hence we omit it.
The problem of finding the zeros of the sum of two mono-
tone operators is widely studied in literature and a plethora
of different splitting method can be used to iteratively solve
the problem [21], [22, Ch. 26]. A necessary first step is to
prove the monotonicity of the defined operators.
Lemma 1: The mappings A and B in (10) are maximally
monotone. Moreover, B is α`2 -cocoercive.
The splitting method chosen here to find zer(A+ B) is the
preconditioned forward-backward splitting (PFB), which can
be applied thanks to the properties stated in Lemma 1.
Remark 1: The choice is driven by two main features
simplicity and implementability. In fact, the PFB requires
only one round of communication between agents at each
iteration, minimizing in this way the most demanding oper-
ation in multi-agent algorithms, i.e., information sharing.
The iteration of the algorithm takes the form of the so called
Krasnosel’skii˘ iteration, namely
$˜k = T$k
$k+1 = $k + η($˜k −$k) (11)
where $k = col(xk,σk,λk), η > 0 and T is the PFB
splitting operator
T = JγΦ−1A ◦ (Id− γΦ−1B) , (12)
where γ > 0 is a step size. The so-called preconditioning
matrix Φ is defined as
Φ :=
τ−1 0 −Λ>0 δ−1ImM E
−Λ E> ε−1
 (13)
where δ ∈ R>0, ε = diag(ε1, . . . , εN ) ⊗ Im with εi >
0, ∀i ∈ N and τ is defined in a similar way.
From (12), we note that fix(T ) = zer(A + B), indeed
$ ∈ fix(T ) ⇔ $ ∈ T$ ⇔ 0 ∈ Φ−1(A + B)$ ⇔ $ ∈
zer(A+B), [22, Th. 26.14]. Thus, the zero-finding problem
is translated into the fixed point problem for the mapping T
in (12).
At this point, we calculate from (11) the explicit update
rules of the variables. We first focus on the first part of
the update, i.e., $˜k = T$k. It can be rewritten as $˜k ∈
JγΦ−1A ◦ (Id− γΦ−1B)$k ⇔ Φ($k − $˜k) ∈ A$˜k +B$k
and finally
0 ∈ A$˜k + B$k + Φ($˜k −$k) , (14)
here $˜k := col(x˜k, σ˜k, λ˜
k
). For ease of notation, we drop
the time superscript k. By solving the first row block of (14),
i.e. 0 ∈ F (x) +NΩ(x˜) + τ−1(x˜− x) + Λ>λ, we obtain
x˜ = JNΩ ◦
(
x− τ (F (x) + Λ>λ)) . (15)
The third row block of (14) instead reads as 0 ∈ b¯ +
NRmN≥0 (λ˜) + Λ(2x˜− x) +E
>(2σ˜ − σ) + ε−1(λ˜− λ) that
leads to
λ˜ = JNRmN≥0
◦(λ−ε(Λ(2x˜−x)− b¯−E>(2σ˜−σ))) . (16)
The second row block of (14) defines the simple update σ˜ =
σ+δEλ. We note that in the update (16) of λ˜, only E>σ is
used, hence an agent i needs only an aggregated information
over the edge variables {σl}l∈Ei , to update its state and the
dual variables. We exploit this property by replacing the edge
variables with z = E>σ ∈ RNm. In this way, the auxiliary
variables are one for each agent, instead of being one for
each edge. Using the property E>E = L ⊗ Im = L, we
cast the update rule of these new auxiliary variables as
z˜k = zk + δLλk
zk+1 = zk + η(z˜k − zk) . (17)
Algorithm 1: SD-GENO
Input: k = 0, x0 ∈ Rn, λ0 ∈ RmN , z0 = 0mN , and
chose η, δ, ε, τ as in Theorem 2.
for i ∈ N do
x˜ki = projΩi
(
xki − τi(∇ifi(xki ,xk−i) +A>i λki )
)
z˜ki = z
k
i + δ
∑
j∈Ni(λ
k
i − λkj )
λ˜ki = projRm≥0
(
λki + εi
(
Ai(2x˜
k
i − xki )
−bi + zki − 2z˜ki
) )
xk+1i = x
k
i + η(x˜
k
i − xki )
zk+1i = z
k
i + η(z˜
k
i − zki )
λk+1i = λ
k
i + η(λ˜
k
i − λki )
k ← k + 1
By introducing z in (16), we then have
λ˜ = JNRmN≥0
◦ (λ+ ε(Λ(2x˜− x)− b¯− 2z˜ + z)) . (18)
The next theorem shows that an equilibrium of the new
mapping is a v-GNE.
Theorem 1: If col(x∗, z∗,λ∗) is a solution to the equa-
tions (15), (17) and (18), with 1>z∗ = 0, then x∗ is a v-
GNE.
Remark 2: The change of auxiliary variables, from σ to z,
is particularly useful in large non-so-sparse networks and it is
in general convenient when the number of edges higher than
the number of nodes. In fact, for dense networks, we have
one auxiliary variable for each player, hence the scalability
of the algorithm is preserved.
C. Synchronous, distributed algorithm with node variables
(SD-GENO)
We are now ready to state the update rules defining
the synchronous version of the proposed algorithm. The
update rule is obtained by gathering (15), (17), (18) and by
modifying the second part of (11) via the auxiliary variables
z:
x˜k = projΩ
(
xk − τ (F (xk) + Λ>λk))
z˜k = zk + δLλk
λ˜
k
= projRmN≥0
(
λk + ε(Λ(2x˜k − xk)− b¯− 2z˜k + zk))
xk+1 = xk + η(x˜k − xk)
zk+1 = zk + η(z˜k − zk)
λk+1 = λk + η(λ˜
k − λk) ,
(19)
See also Algorithm 1, for the local updates.
The convergence of Algorithm 1 to the v-GNE of the game
in (2) is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let ϑ > `
2
2α , ε, δ, τ > 0 such that Φ−ϑI  0
and η ∈ (0, 4αϑ−`22αϑ ). Then, Algorithm 1 converges to the v-
GNE of the game in (2).
V. ASYNCHRONOUS DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
In this section, we present the main contribution of the
paper, the Asynchronous Distributed GNE Seeking Algorithm
with Node variables (AD-GENO), namely, the asynchronous
counterpart of Algorithm 1. As in the previous section, we
first define a preliminary version of the algorithm using the
edge auxiliary variables σ, and then we derive the final
formulation via the variable z. To achieve an asynchronous
update of the agent variables, we adopt the “ARock” frame-
work [13].
A. Algorithm design
We modify the update rule in (11) to describe the asyn-
chronism, in the local update of the agent i, as follows
$k+1 = $k + ηΥi(T$
k −$k) , (20)
where Υi is a real diagonal matrix of dimension n+ (N +
M)m, where the element [Υi]jj is 1 if the j-th element
of col(x, σ, λ) is an element of col(xi, {σl}l∈Eouti , λi)
and 0 otherwise.We assume that the choice of which agent
performs the update at iteration k ∈ N≥0 is ruled by an i.i.d.
random variable ζk, that takes values in Υ := {Υi}i∈N .
Given a discrete probability distribution (p1, . . . , pN ), let
P[ζk = Υi] = pi, ∀i ∈ N . Therefore, the formulation in
(20) becomes
$k+1 = $k + ηζk(T$k −$k) . (21)
We also consider the possibility of delayed information,
namely the update (21) can be performed with outdated
values of $k. We refer to [13, Sec. 1] for a more complete
overview on the topic. Due to the structure of the Υi, the
update of xi, λi and {σl}l∈Eouti are performed at the same
moment, hence they share the same delay ϕki at k.
We denote the vector of possibly delayed information at
time k as $ˆk, hence the reformulation of (21) reads as
$k+1 = $k + ηζk(T − Id)$ˆk . (22)
Now, we impose that the maximum delay is uniformly
bounded.
Standing Assumption 4 (Bounded maximum delay): The
delays are uniformly upper bounded, i.e. there exists ϕ¯ > 0
such that supk∈N≥0 maxi∈N {ϕki } ≤ ϕ¯ < +∞.
From the computational perspective, we assume that each
player i has a public and a private memory. The first stores
the information obtained by the neighbours Ni. The private
is instead used during the update of i at time k and it is
an unchangeable copy of the public memory at iteration k.
The local update rules in Algorithm 2 are obtained similarly
to Sec. IV-B for SD-GENO, hence by using the definition
of T . The obtained algorithm resembles ADAGNES in [14,
Alg. 1], therefore we name it E-ADAGNES.
The convergence of the update (22) is proven relying on
the theoretical results provided in [13] for the Krasnosel’skii˘
asynchronous iteration.
Theorem 3: Let η ∈ (0, 4αϑ−`2αϑ cNpmin4ϕ¯√pmin+1 ], where
pmin := min{pi}i∈N and c ∈ (0, 1). Then, the sequence
Algorithm 2: E-ADAGNES
Input: k = 0, x0 ∈ Rn, λ0 ∈ RmN , σ0 = 0mM , chose
η, δ, ε, τ as in Theorem 2.
Iteration k: Select the agent ik with probability
P(ζk = Υik) = pik
Reading: Agent ik copies in its private memory the
current values of the public memory, i.e. x
k−ϕkj
j ,
λ
k−ϕkj
j for j ∈ Nik and σk−ψ
k
l
l , ∀l ∈ Eik
Update:
x˜kik = projΩik
(
x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
− τik(∇ikfik(x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
, xˆk−ik) +
A>ikλ
k−ϕk
ik
ik
)
)
σ˜kl = σ
k−ϕkik
l + δ([E]l ⊗ Im)λˆ
k
, ∀l ∈ Eoutik
λ˜kik = projRm≥0
(
λ
k−ϕk
ik
ik
+ εik(Aik(2x˜
k
ik − x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
)−
bik − ([E>]ik ⊗ Im)(2σ˜k − σˆk))
)
xk+1i = x
k−ϕk
ik
i + η(x˜
k
i − xki − ϕkik)
σk+1l = σ
k−ϕkik
l + η(σ˜
k
l − σk−ψ
k
l
l ) , ∀l ∈ Eik
λk+1i = λ
k−ϕk
ik
i + η(λ˜
k
i − λ
k−ϕk
ik
i )
Writing: Agent ik writes in the public memories of
j ∈ Nik the new values of xk+1ik , λk+1ik and
{σk+1l }l∈Eout
ik
k ← k + 1
{xk}k∈N≥0 defined by Algorithm 2 converges to the v-GNE
of the game in (2) almost surely.
B. Asynchronous, distributed algorithm with node variables
(AD-GENO)
We complete the technical part of the paper by perform-
ing the change from auxiliary variables over the edges to
variables over the nodes, attaining in this way the final
formulation of our proposed algorithm. With Algorithm 2 as
starting point, we show that this change does not affect the
dynamics of the pair (x,λ), thus preserving the convergence.
However, in this case, we need to introduce an extra
variable for each node i, i.e., µi ∈ Rm. This is an aggregate
information that groups all the changes of the neighbours
dual variables from the previous update of i to the present
iteration. We highlight that these variables are updated during
the writing phase of the neighbours, therefore they do not
require extra communications between the agents.
Remark 3: The need for µi ∈ Rm arises from the different
update frequency between {σl}l∈Ei and zi. Therefore, we
cannot characterize the dynamics of σ, if we define z =
E>σ only.
Algorithm 3 presents AD-GENO, where µi are rigorously
defined.
Algorithm 3: AD-GENO
Input: k = 0, x0 ∈ Rn, λ0 ∈ RmN , z0 = 0mN , chose
η, δ, ε, τ as in Theorem 2. For all i ∈ N and
µi = 0m.
Iteration k: Select the agent ik with probability
P[ζk = Υik ] = pik
Reading: Agent ik copies in its private memory the
actual values of the public memory, i.e. x
k−ϕkj
j ,
λ
k−ϕkj
j , z
k−ϕkj
j for j ∈ Nik and µi. Reset the public
values of µi to 0m.
Update:
x˜kik = projΩik
(
x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
− τik(∇ikfik(x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
, xˆk−ik) +
A>ikλ
k−ϕk
ik
ik
)
)
z˜kik = z
k−ϕki
ik
+ δηµik
λ˜kik = projRm≥0
(
λ
k−ϕk
ik
ik
+ εik(Aik(2x˜
k
ik − x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
) −
bik − z˜k−ϕ
k
i
ik
−2δ∑j∈Ni\{i}(λk−ϕkikik − λk−ϕkjj ))
xk+1i = x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
+ η(x˜kik − x
k−ϕk
ik
ik
)
zk+1
ik
= z˜kik + ηδ
∑
l∈Eoutik
([E]l ⊗ Im)λˆk
λk+1
ik
= λ
k−ϕk
ik
ik
+ η(λ˜kik − λ
k−ϕk
ik
ik
)
Writing: Agent ik writes in the public memories of
j ∈ Nik the new values of xk+1ik and λk+1ik , for
j ∈ Nik \ {ik} the player ik also overwrites µj as
µj ← µj + λk−ϕ
k
j
j − λ
k−ϕk
ik
i
k ← k + 1
The convergence of AD-GENO is proven by the following
theorem. Essentially, we show that introducing z does not
change the dynamics of (x,λ).
Theorem 4: Let η ∈ (0, 4αϑ−`2αϑ cNpmin4ϕ¯√pmin+1 ] with pmin :=
min{pi}i∈N and c ∈ (0, 1). Then, the sequence {xk}k∈N≥0
defined by Algorithm 3 converges to the v-GNE of the game
in (2) almost surely.
VI. SIMULATION
This section presents the implementation of AD-GENO to
solve a network Cournot game, that models the interaction
of N companies competing over m markets. The problem
is widely studied and we adopt a set-up similar to the one
in [23], [5]. We chose N = 8 companies, each operating 4
strategies, i.e., xi ∈ R4, ∀i ∈ N . It ranges in 0 ≤ xi ≤ Ωi,
where Ωi ∈ R4 ans its elements are randomly drawn from
[10, 45]. The markets are m = 4, named A, B, C and D.
In Figure 1, an edge between a company and a market is
drawn, if at least one of that player’s strategies is applied
to that market. Two companies are neighbors if they share a
market. The constraint matrix is A = [A1, . . . , AN ] ∈ R4×32
and the columns k of Ai have a nonzero element in position
A B C D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(b)
Fig. 1: (a) Interactions of the players {1, . . . , 8} with the
markets A, B, C, D, (b) Communication network between
players arising from the competition.
j if the k-th strategy of player i is applied to market j.
The nonzero values are randomly chosen from [0.6, 1]. The
elements of b ∈ R4 are the markets’ maximal capacities and
are randomly chosen from [20, 100]. The arising inequality
coupling constraint is Ax ≤ b. The local cost function is
fi(xi,x−i) = ci(x) − P (x)>Aixi, where ci(x) is the cost
of playing a certain strategy and P (x) the price obtained by
the market. We define the markets price as a linear function
P (x) = P¯ − DAx, where P¯ ∈ R4 and D ∈ R4×4 is a
diagonal matrix, the values of their elements are randomly
chosen respectively from [250, 500] and [1, 5]. The cost
function is quadratic ci(x) = x>i Qixi + q
>
i xi, where the
elements of the diagonal matrix Qi ∈ R4×4 and the vector
qi ∈ R4 are randomly drawn respectively from [1, 8] and
[1, 4]. We propose two setups, the case of communication
over a ring graph with alphabetic order and the case of
random communication (in Figure 2, respectively the blue
and red trajectories). In the latter, we only ensure that every
20N iterations all the agents performed a similar number
of updates. The edges of the graph are arbitrarily oriented.
We assume that the agents update with uniform probability,
i.e., P [ζk = Υi] = 1N . The step sizes δ, ε, τ in AD-GENO
are randomly chosen, the first from [0.5, 0.2] and the others
from [0.5, 0.03], in order to ensure Φ  0 and η = 0.35. The
maximum delay is assumed ϕ¯ = 4, therefore $ˆk in (22) is
$ˆk = col($ˆk1 , . . . , $ˆ
k
N ) where each $ˆ
k
i is randomly chosen
from {$ˆk−ϕ¯i , . . . , $ˆki }.
The results of the simulations are shown in Figure 2. In
particular, Figure 2a presents the convergence of the collec-
tive strategy xk to the v-GNE x∗. Furthermore, Figure 2b
highlights the convergence of the Lagrangian multipliers to
consensus. We noticed that a simple update sequence, as the
alphabetically ordered one, leads to a faster convergence than
a random one. In general, the more the agents’ updates are
well mixed the faster the algorithm converge.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work propose a variant of the forward-backward split-
ting algorithm to solve generalized Nash equilibrium prob-
lems via asynchronous and distributed information exchange,
that is robust to communication delays. A change of variables
based on the node Laplacian matrix of the information-
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 2: Communication in alphabetic order (blue) versus
random communication (red): (a) Normalized distance from
equilibrium,(b) Norm of the disagreement vector, (c) Aver-
aged constraints violation (the negative values are omitted).
exchange graph allows one to preserve the scalability of the
solution algorithm in the number of nodes (as opposed to the
number of edges). Full theoretical and numerical comparison
between the proposed solution algorithm and that in [14] is
left as future work. Another interesting topic is the adaptation
of the algorithm to the case of changing graph topology, in
fact the independence from the edge variables makes this
approach more suitable to address this problem.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
It follows as in [5, Proof of Th. 4.5].
Proof of Theorem 1
Given the equilibrium point col(x∗,λ∗, z∗), (17) evalu-
ated in the equilibrium reduces to 0 = Lλ∗, that implies
λ∗ = λ∗ ⊗ 1.
Moreover manipulating (18) and evaluating it in the equi-
librium, we obtain
0 ∈ NRmN≥0 (λ
∗) + b¯− Λx∗ + 2δLλ∗ + z∗ . (23)
Exploiting the property Lλ∗ = 0 and multiplying both side
of (23) by (1> ⊗ I) leads to
0 ∈ (1> ⊗ I)(NRmN≥0 (λ
∗) + b¯− Λx∗ + z∗) . (24)
Using the fact that
∑
i∈N NRm≥0(λ
∗) = N∩i∈NRm≥0(λ
∗) =
NRm≥0(λ
∗) and the assumption 1>z∗ = 0, (24) becomes
0 ∈ NRm≥0(λ∗) + b¯−Ax∗ . (25)
Finally, (15) evaluated in the equilibrium is
0 ∈ F (x∗) +NΩ(x∗) + Λ>λ∗ , (26)
or equivalently
0 ∈ ∇fi(x∗i ,x∗−i) +NΩi(x∗i ) +A>i λ∗ , ∀i ∈ N . (27)
Inclusions (27) and (25) are the KKT conditions in (7), hence
from [6, Th. 3.1] we conclude that col(x∗,λ∗, z∗) is a v-
GNE of the game.
Proof of Theorem 2
First, we note from [5, Lem. 5.6] that the two opera-
tors Φ−1B and Φ−1A are respectively αϑ`2 -cocoercive and
maximally monotone. Furthermore, this also implies that
(Id − Φ−1B) is `22αϑ -AVG and JΦ−1A = (Id + Φ−1A)
is FNE. Applying [24, Prop. 2.4], we conclude that T is
2αϑ
4αϑ−`2 -AVG. The Krasnosel’skii˘ iteration in (11) converges
to $∗ ∈ fix(T ) if η ∈ (0, 4αϑ−`22αϑ ), [22, Th. 5.14].
From the above argument, it holds that limk→+∞ σk =
σ∗, hence limk→+∞E>σk = E>σ∗ =: z∗, therefore
also z converges. Therefore, we conclude that Algorithm 1
converges to col(x∗,λ∗, z∗). The choice of the initial value
z0 = 0, implies that 1>zk = 0, ∀k ∈ N≥0 since its values
will in the range of the Laplacian matrix. Finally, applying
Theorem 1 we conclude that the equilibrium is the v-GNE
of the original game.
Proof of Theorem 3
From the proof of Theorem 2, we know that T is 2αϑ4αϑ−`2 -
AVG, therefore is can be rewritten as T = (1− 2αϑ4αϑ−`2 )Id +
2αϑ
4αϑ−`2P , where P is nonexpansive, [22, Prop. 4.35]. By
substituting it into (22), we obtain
$k+1 = $k +
2ηαϑ
4αϑ− `2 ζ
k(P − Id)$ˆk . (28)
For (28), we apply [13, Lem. 13 and Lem. 14], to con-
clude that {$k}k∈N≥0 is bounded and that it converges
almost surely to $∗ ∈ fix(P ) = fix(T ), for 2ηαϑ4αϑ−`2 ∈
(0, cNpmin2ϕ¯√pmin+1 ] with pmin := min{pi}i∈N . Since fix(T ) =
zer(A+B), we conclude from Proposition 1 that {xk}k∈N≥0
converges to the v-GNE of (2) almost surely.
Proof of Theorem 4
The change of auxiliary variables in Algorithm 3 from σ
to z leads to a different update rule for λ, instead the one for
x remains unchanged. Therefore, if we show that the new
update of λ is equivalent to the one in Algorithm 2, we can
infer the convergence from Theorem 3.
We prove by induction that, given an agent i, the update
of λi at time k in Algorithm 2 and 3 are equivalent. Note
that the two update rules are equivalent if it holds that
z˜ki = ([E
>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk , (29)
for every k > 0 and i ∈ N .
Base case: Iteration k is the first in which agent i updates
its variables. If k = 0, then µi = 0m in AD-GENO and
σˆ0 = 0mM in E-ADAGNES, hence (29) is trivially verified.
If instead k > 0, it holds that zk−ϕ
k
i
i = z
0
i = 0m, while
σˆk 6= 0mM , since the neighbours of i can update more than
once before the first update of i. We define for each j ∈ Ni
the set Skj , a t ∈ N where t < k belongs to Skj if at the
iteration t of the algorithm agent j completes an update. We
define the maximum time in Skj as mkj := max{t | t ∈ Skj }
and Sˇkj := Skj \mkj . From this definitions, we obtain that
([E>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk =
∑
l∈Eouti σ
0
l −
∑
d∈Eini σ
mkj
d , (30)
where j is the element of ed different from i. Furthermore,
from the update rule of σd in Algorithm 2, we derive
σ
mkj
d = −σ
max{t | t∈Sˇkj }
l − ηδ(λ
max{t | t∈Sˇkj }
j − λ0i )
= ηδ
∑
h∈Sˇkj
(
λ0i − λhj
) (31)
Substituting (31) into (30) leads to
([E>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk = η δ
2
([∑
j∈Ni\{i}|Sˇkj |
]
λ0i
−∑j∈Ni\{i}∑h∈Sˇkj λhj ) .
(32)
From the definition given in Algorithm 3 of µi, we attain
that ([E>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk = ηδµi = z˜ki , therefore (29) hold.
Induction step: Suppose that (29) holds for some k¯ >
0 that corresponds the latest iteration in which agent i
performed the update, i.e. zk¯i 6= 0.
Consider the next iteration k in which agent i updates,
k > k¯. Here, Skj is defined as above, but for time indexes
(k¯, k]. Following a similar reasoning to the previous case,
we obtain
([E>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk = ([E>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk¯ + ηδ
∑
l∈Eouti
([E]l ⊗ Im)λˆk¯
+ ηδ
([∑
j∈Ni\{i}|Sˇkj |
]
λ0i −
∑
j∈Ni\{i}
∑
h∈Sˇkj λ
h
j
)
(33)
where we used the fact that l ∈ Eouti is updated at the same
time of i. Furthermore, from the induction assumption,
([E>]i ⊗ Im)σˆk = zk¯i + ηδ
([∑
j∈Ni\{i}|Sˇkj |
]
λ0i
−∑j∈Ni\{i}∑h∈Sˇkj λhj )
= zk¯i + ηδµi = z˜
k
i ,
(34)
where the last step holds because in the reading phase of
Algorithm 3, we reset to zero the values of µi, every time i
starts an update. Therefore, (29) holds for k.
This concludes the proof by induction, showing that the
update of λi defined in Algorithm 3 is equivalent to the one
in Algorithm 2, for any k. Finally, since the pair (x,λ) has
an update rule equivalent to the one in E-ADAGNES, the
convergence of {x}k∈N≥0 to the v-GNE of the game (2)
follows by Theorem 3.
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